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JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT

The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated
§78A-3-102(3)(j). Appellate jurisdiction for this case can be found at Utah Code
Annotated §78B-ll-129(i)(a).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The Appellate presents two issues for review. Both issues are closely related
with identical standard of review.
Issue 1. Did the District Court err by not compelling arbitration for the
following issue:
Did the UTA breach its duty to collectively bargain a successor
agreement with the Union and wrongfully declare an impasse in
negotiations and unilaterally implement terms and conditions of
employment in violation of the 13(c) Arrangement and the
collective bargaining rights it protects under applicable laws,
policies and agreement? If so, what is the remedy?
Issue 2.

Are the allegations; that the UTA breached its duty to

collectively bargain a successor agreement with the Union, declared
wrongfully an impasse in negotiations, and implemented wrongfully

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

{

unilateral terms and conditions of employment; subject to arbitration
pursuant to the parties' Section 13(c) Protective Arrangement?
Standard of Review.

The District Court's denial of a Motion to Compel

Arbitration and interpretation of an agreement to arbitrate presents a question of law
which the appellate courts review for correctness. Sosa v. Paulos, 924 P.2d 357
(Utah 1996), and Jenkins v. Peraval 962 P.2d 796 (Utah 1988).
Issue Preservation.

Both issues were preserved at the trial court by the

Appellant filing its initial motion to compel arbitration (R. 62-63) and by the
subsequent presentation of argument. (R. 12-64).

STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The following statutes are subject to interpretation by this court with this
appeal:
Utah Code Annotated §17B-2a-813(l) and (2) which reads as follows:
(1) The rights, benefits, and other employee protective
conditions and remedies of Section 13(c) of the Urban Mass
Transportation Act of 1964, 49 U.S.C. Sec. 5333(b), as
determined by the Secretary of Labor, apply to a public transit
district's establishment and operation of a public transit service
or system.
(2) (a) Employees of a public transit system established and
operated by a public transit district have the right to:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR,
2 may contain errors.

(i) self-organization;
(ii) form, join, or assist labor organizations; and
(iii) bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing.
(b)
Employees of a public transit district and labor
organizations may not join in a strike against the public transit
system operated by the public transit district.
(c) Each public transit district shall:
(i) recognize and bargain exclusively with any
labor organization representing a majority of the
district's employees in an appropriate unit with
respect to wages, salaries, hours, working
conditions, and welfare, pension, and retirement
provisions; and
(ii) upon reaching agreement with the labor
organization, enter into an execute a written
contract incorporating the agreement.
Utah Code Annotated §78B-11-107(1) and (2) which reads as follows:
(1) An agreement contained in a record to submit to arbitration
any existing or subsequent controversy arising between the
parties to the agreement is valid, enforceable, and irrevocable
except upon a ground that exists at law or in equity for the
revocation of a contract.
(2) The court shall decide whether an agreement to arbitrate
exists or a controversy is subject to an agreement to arbitrate.

STATEMENT OF CASE
Appellee Utah Transit Authority (hereinafter "UTA") is a Utah public transit
district. Appellant Local 382 of the Amalgamated Transit Union (hereinafter
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR,
3 may contain errors.

"Union") is the exclusive bargaining representative for UTA operations, parts, and
maintenance employees.

During the course of negotiating a new collective

bargaining agreement between the UTA and the Union, in the latter half of 2009,
certain labor disputes arose between the UTA and the Union which the Union grieved
and sought to arbitrate. On April 23, 2010, the UTA filed a complaint for declaratory
relief requesting that the District Court decree (1) that certain labor disputes between
the Union and the UTA are not arbitrable and (2) that the court determine whether or
not the parties were at an impasse in their negotiations on December 21, 2009. (R. 16).
The Union responded with a Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Stay the
Judicial Proceeding. (R. 62-64). Shortly thereafter, the UTA filed its Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment requesting that the Court hold that the labor disputes
between the parties were not arbitrable. (R. 65-67). The motions were fully briefed
and a hearing was held before the trial court on July 9, 2010. The Court took the
matter under advisement. (R. 186).
On September 8, 2010, the Court rendered the decision denying the Union's
Motion to Compel Arbitration and granted the UTA's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment. (R. 189-195). Pursuant to Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and on
September 16, 2010, the Union filed a Motion to Amend the Court's Ruling. (R. 196Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR,
4 may contain errors.

198). The Court held a hearing on Motion to Amend on November 1, 2010. At the
hearing, the parties made joint recommendations on how the Court's Ruling should
be amended. The Court accepted the recommendations and an Amended Ruling was
entered on November 9, 2010. (R. 219-223). An appeal to this Court was filed on
November 23, 2010. (R. 224-226).

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The UTA is a Utah public transit district within the meaning of the Public
Transit District Act, U.C.A. §§17B-2a-801, et seq.

It operates in several Utah

counties along the Wasatch Front. The UTA's headquarters are in Salt Lake County.
(R. 190).
The Union is an unincorporated association with its principal office in Salt
Lake County. Pursuant to U.C.A. § 17B-2-813(2)(b)(i), the UTA has recognized the
Union as the exclusive representative for purposes of collective bargaining terms and
conditions of employment for certain UTA employees.

A series of collective

bargaining agreements (hereinafter "C.B.A.") were negotiated between the UTA and

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the Union; the last such C.B.A. expired by its term on December 10, 2009, but was
extended by the parties through December 21, 2009. (R. 190).l
As a condition of the UTA receiving federal funds, the UTA has been and
continues to be obligated to honor certain labor protections for the benefit of
employees represented by the Union, pursuant to Section 13(c) of the Urban Mass
Transit Act of 1964 (now codified as 49 U.S.C. § 5333(b), known as the Section
13(c) Arrangement (hereinafter "Arrangement"). (R. 190). Under Section 13(c), the
United States Department of Labor must ensure that "fair and equitable"
arrangements are in place in its certifications before the Federal Department of
Transportation can release federal funds to state transit districts. As indicated in the
Department of Labor's certifications, these arrangements are made part of the
contract assistance which is an agreement between the UTA and the United States
Department of Transportation which is entered into each time the UTA receives
federal funding. The terms and conditions of the Arrangements are intended for the
primary and direct benefit of transit employees which here are represented by the
Union.

The employees represented by the Union are, then, intended third-party

beneficiaries to the employee protective arrangements of the grant contract between
the Department of Transportation and the UTA and the UTA has and continues to so
1

After the commencement of this Appeal, the UTA and the Union entered into a new
C.B.A. effective April 1,2011.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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signify by executing the contract of assistance each time it is awarded a federal grant.
(R. 155). A copy of the relevant portions of the Arrangement is attached at the end of
this Brief as Appendix "C" (R. 15, 31-43).

Paragraph 8 of the Arrangement is the arbitration clause which both the UTA
and the Union seek an interpretation from this Court. The critical paragraph 8(a)
reads as follows:
Any labor dispute or controversy between the
Public Body and any employee represented by the
Union or between the Public Body [UTA] and the
Union, regarding the application, interpretation, or
enforcement of this Arrangement, which cannot be
settled by the parties within thirty (30) days after
the dispute or controversy first arises, may be
submitted at the written request of either the Public
Body or the Union to a board of arbitration to be
selected as hereinafter provided. [Emphasis Added]
(R. 37).
By reason of the UTA declaring an impasse, refusing to negotiate further and
imposing new terms and conditions of employment, the Union contended that arbitrable
labor disputes exist, under paragraph 8(a) regarding the application, interpretation, or
enforcement of paragraph 3 of the Arrangement. Paragraph 3 of the Arrangement reads
as follows:

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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The collective bargaining rights of employees
represented by the Union including the right to
arbitrate or otherwise resolve labor disputes and to
maintain check-off arrangements, as provided by
applicable laws, policies and/or existing collective
bargaining agreements shall be preserved and
continued; provided, however, that this provision
shall not be interpreted so as to require the Public
Body to retain any such rights which exist by
virtue of a collective bargaining agreement after
such agreement is no longer in effect, except (a) as
may otherwise be required under Federal labor
policy with respect to the arbitration of grievances
arising under such agreement, or (b) as may be
required under applicable law, including Section
13(c) of the Act, or (c) as may be required under
paragraph (9) of this Arrangement. The Public
body [UTA] agrees, that it will bargain collectively
with the Union or otherwise arrange for the
continuation of collective bargaining, and that it
will enter into agreements with the Union or
arrange for such agreements to be entered into,
relative to all subjects which are or may be proper
subjects of collective bargaining.
[Emphasis
Added].
(R. 32). The UTA contended that the disputes, regarding impasse and imposing new
terms and conditions of employment between the UTA and the Union, do not arise
under the above quoted paragraphs 3 and 8(a) and are not otherwise arbitrable but
instead arises exclusively under U.C.A. §17-B-2a-813(2) for the court to determine.
(R. 1-6).

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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These labor disputes involve facts surrounding attempts of the UTA and the
Union to negotiate the terms and conditions for a successor C.B.A. The parties began
negotiations for a new C.B.A. in August, 2009 and, between then and December 21,
2009 met about fourteen (14) times. (R. 220). The Union has alleged that, during the
negotiation period, the UTA failed to bargain in good faith by engaging in surface
bargaining, by refusing to provide information, by declaring wrongfully an "impasse",
and by implementing wrongfully terms and conditions of employment. (R. 124-125).
On December 4, 2009, the UTA unilaterally discontinued negotiations with the
Union. On December 21, 2009, the UTA unilaterally declared impasse and imposed
terms and conditions of employment. (R. 200). The Union alleged that the parties
were not at impasse, that the UTA had not been bargaining in good faith and that the
UTA's unilateral imposition of terms and conditions of employment were unfair labor
practices and violations of the Arrangement. The Union requested that all these issues
be submitted to arbitration. The UTA agreed to submit to arbitration only the issues
surrounding whether or not imposing terms and conditions of employment violated
the Arrangement with respect to the Arrangement's Fact-Finding Provisions as
contained in paragraph 9. The UTA responded to the other request for arbitration of
the alleged breach of the duty to bargain issue with a "no" and filed the subject
complaint on April 23, 2010. (R. 1-6, 53).

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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During the prosecution of the complaint, the parties proceeded with the
arbitration of the other related issues. (R. 741, P. 4-5). Subsequent to the filing of the
Notice of Appeal herein, a decision was rendered in the related arbitration.

The

<

arbitration award was very favorable to the Union and against the UTA. As a result,
the Union and the UTA resumed negotiations and entered into a new C.B.A. effective

(

April 1, 2011. (Contemporaneously with the filing of this Brief, the Union has filed a
Motion to Supplement the Record on Appeal pursuant to Rule 11(h), Utah Rules of
i

Appellate Procedures, for purpose of placing the post-appeal facts before this Court.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The UTA and the Union are required by both Utah statute and by a Section
13(c) Arrangement to collectively bargain over the terms and conditions of
employment. It is an unfair labor practice for one party to not engage in good faith
bargaining. Should there be allegations of failure to bargain in good faith, those
allegations must be resolved by an arbitrator pursuant to the arbitration clause
contained in the Section 13(c) Arrangement.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I: THE UTA IS REQUIRED BY CONTRACT
AND STATUTE TO BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY
WITH THE UNION.
There are very few statutes and even fewer cases which codify and describe
the nature of collective labor relations between the State of Utah and its employees.
Today, the employees of the UTA are the only public employees in Utah who have the
statutory rights to unionize and to bargain collectively over their terms and conditions
of employment. These statutory rights can be found at U.C.A. §17B-2a-813.
There is only one published case which interprets the above statute (actually,
the predecessor statute of U.C.A. § 17A-2-1031). That case is Burke, et. al. v. Utah
Transit Authority, et. al., 462 F. 3d 1253, cert, denied, (10th Circuit, 2006).
The Burke case involved two UTA employees who worked in the TRAX
division. These employees alleged that the company-wide bargaining unit at the UTA
was not an "appropriate" unit under Utah and federal law. So those two TRAX
employees filed suit against the UTA, the Union, and the U.S. Department of Labor.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, in affirming the U.S. District Court for Utah,
held that the company-wide unit was appropriate under both Utah and federal law.
Although the resolution of the central dispute in Burke is not helpful toward resolving
the case at hand, the circuit court of appeal's analysis of the development of Utah
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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i

labor law for its public transit workers and the relationship of that Utah law to federal
labor law is incredibly helpful.
The reason Utah has adopted a different approach to public employee labor
relations with its public transit district employees is because of Section 13(c) of the
Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, 49 U.S.C. § 5333(b), which reads, in
pertinent part, as follows:
(1) As a condition of financial assistance..., the interests
of employees affected by the assistance shall be protected
under arrangements the Secretary of Labor concludes are
fair and equitable...
(2) Arrangements.. .shall include provisions that may
be necessary for (A) the preservation of rights, privileges, and benefits
(including continuation of pension rights and
benefits) under existing collective bargaining
agreements or otherwise;
(B) the continuation of collective bargaining rights;
(C) the protection of individual employees against a
worsening of their positions related to
employment...
As gleaned from the above language and court cases, the purpose of this section is to
protect the collective bargaining rights of the employees of public transit districts
which receive federal funding.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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19.

The first significant court interpretation of Section 13(c) occurred in 1982 by
the U.S. Supreme Court in the case known as Jackson Transit Authority v. Local
Division 1285, Amalgamated Transit Union, 457 U.S. 15 (1982). In the Jackson case,
the Supreme Court held that the transit union had no federal cause of action against a
public transit authority for purposes of enforcing the terms and conditions of
collective bargaining agreements. It is because of the Jackson case and its progeny
that both UTA and the Union agree that the subject Section 13(c) Arrangement must
be enforced in Utah courts and using primarily Utah law.
Although Utah law is primary, that does not mean that federal labor policy
plays no role. This is because of the next significant court interpretation of Section
13(c), Amalgamated Transit International Union v. Donovan, 767 F. 2d 939 (D.C.,
1985). In the Donovan case, the State of Georgia had adopted legislation which made
it impossible for employees of the state transit district to collectively bargain for
certain economic considerations. When the public transit district requested federal
funds, the union objected to the Department of Labor claiming that Georgia law
violated Section 13(c).

Despite the objection, the Secretary of Labor, Raymond

Donovan, certified Georgia law as being "fair and equitable" under Section 13(c).
The union filed a law suit against Donovan.
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The Donovan case, in an excellent review of Jackson and federal and state labor
came to the following conclusions about the meaning of Section 13(c):
In sum, Congress struck a delicate balance in
section 13(c). The statute provides that state law should
govern the labor relations of public transit authorities and
their employees, but it conditions federal transit aid, in
part, on the continuation of collective bargaining rights.
In setting out those rights, Congress chose not to
incorporate the entire structure and requirements of the
NLRA into section 13(c), for to do so would force states
to choose between federal transit aid and their exclusion
from the coverage of the NLRA. On the other hand,
Congress made it clear that federal labor policy would
dictate the substantive meaning of collective bargaining
for purposes of section 13(c). 'Good faith' bargaining, to
a point of impasse if necessary, over wages, hours and
other terms and conditions of employment has always
been the essence of federally-defined collective
bargaining rights; indeed, excluding the federal sector, it
is the almost universally recognized definition of
collective bargaining in the United States.
Section 13(c)'s requirement, therefore, that labor
protective agreements provide for "the continuation of
collective bargaining rights" means, at a minimum, that
where employees enjoyed collective bargaining rights
prior to public acquisition of the transit system, they are
entitled to be represented in meaningful, "good faith"
negotiations with their employer over wages, hours and
other terms and conditions of employment. Collective
bargaining does not exist if any employer retains the
power to establish wages, hours and other conditions of
employment without the consent of the union or without
at least first bargaining in good faith to impasse over
disputed mandatory subjects. It is against this standard
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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that we must measure [Georgia's Act and Georgia's
public transit district's labor protective agreement].
767 F. 2d at 950-951.
To comply with the requirements of Donovan, the Department of Labor
promulgated rules for the process by which the Secretary of Labor would deem the
employee protective arrangements as "fair and equitable" pursuant to Section 13(c).
The rules can be found at 29 CFR § 215. The rules encourage the union and the
transit body to agree on the employee protective terms that the Department of Labor
will certify as "fair.and equitable" in a document entitled a Section 13(c) Agreement.
Should the parties be unable to agree upon such terms, the Department of Labor
decides what are to be fair and equitable terms and conditions to protect the rights
afforded to employees under the Section 13(c) statute in a document entitled a Section
13(c) Arrangement.

As discussed above, the Arrangement becomes part of the

Department of Labor's certification of fair and equitable protections and the contract
of assistance between the transit body and the U.S. Department of Transportation
when the transit body received federal funds, and transit body's employees are thirdparty beneficiaries of the Arrangement. (R. 155).
Since September 29, 1993, the UTA, by accepting hundreds of millions of
dollars in federal aid, has been bound by the Section 13(c) Arrangement which is
attached to this Brief as Appendix "C". Paragraph 3 of the Arrangement obligates the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR,
15 may contain errors.
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UTA to bargain collectively with the Union. The pertinent language of paragraph 3
reads:
The collective bargaining rights of employees
represented by the Union...shall be preserved and
continued...The Public body [UTA] agrees that it will
bargain collectively with the Union... and that it [UTA]
will enter into agreements with the Union.. .relative to all
subjects which are or may be proper subjects of
collective bargaining.

<

,

The UTA entered into the above contract not only to receive federal funding,
i

but also to comply with U.C.A. § 17B-2a-813(l), which reads as follows:
The rights, benefits, and other employee protective
conditions and remedies of Section 13(c) of the Urban
Mass Transportation Act of 1964, 49 U.S.C. Sec.
5333(b), as determined by the Secretary of Labor, apply
to a public transit district's establishment and operation
of a public transit service or system.
As discussed above, the Arrangement is the determination of the Secretary of Labor of
the "rights, benefits, and other employee protective conditions and remedies of
Section 13(c)...". U.C.A. § 17B-2a-813(l).
The UTA's obligation to collectively bargain with the Union is further
established by the statutory requirement at the UTA collectively bargain with the
Union. U.C.A. § 17B-2d-813(2)(c)(i) which reads as follows:
Each public transit district [UTA] shall: (i) recognize
and bargain exclusively with any labor organization
representing a majority of the district's employees in an
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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appropriate unit with respect to wages, salaries, hours,
working conditions, and welfare, pension, and retirement
provisions;
The UTA and the Union do not dispute that the UTA has a statutory and
contractual obligation to engage in collective bargaining with the Union. The dispute
instead centers around what happens when the Union complains and alleges that the
UTA is not engaged in good faith collective bargaining. In federal labor law, the
failure to engage in good faith bargaining is known as an unfair labor practice.

POINT II: IT IS AN UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE FOR ONE
PARTY TO REFUSE TO COLLECTIVELY BARGAIN
IN GOOD FAITH.

Utah courts have rarely been asked to resolve collective bargaining disputes.
This is because, in general, Utah public employees do not have collective bargaining
rights; and also because the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (hereinafter
"NLRA"), 29 USC 151-169, preempts state regulation when it comes to determining
the scope and duty of collective bargaining rights and obligations in the private sector.
See Building Trades Council (San Diego) v. Garmon, 359 US 236 (1959).
Accordingly, federal labor laws and policies are well developed. Therefore, it
is natural to turn to federal law in order to evaluate the duties and obligations of the
collective bargaining responsibilities of the UTA. Indeed, the federal labor law
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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policies, as argued above, "dictate the substantive meaning of collective bargaining
for purposes of section 13(c)." Donovan, 767 F. 2d at 950-951.
Furthermore, by reason of the express wording of U.C.A. § 17B-2a-813(l),

<

Utah has effectively adopted the federal labor policies and protections of the Section
13(c) of the Urban Mass Transportation Act "as determined by the Secretary of

,

Labor." Further, the UTA does not dispute that the Utah code requires it "to bargain
in good faith to impasse, if necessary, as stated by the court in Donovan." (R. 78).
Good faith bargaining entails many things. It is not merely an obligation to
meet and confer or to go through those motions but has been defined as an
i

"obligation.. .[t]o participate actively in the deliberations so as to indicate a present
intention to find a basis for agreement..." NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 133
F2d 676, 686 (CA 9, 1943). Courts and the National Labor Relations Board
(hereinafter "NLRB") look at the totality of conduct by which the quality of the
negotiations is tested including factors such as withdrawal of tentative agreements,
denial of the Union's request for information, good faith dealings, the subjects of
bargaining (whether they are mandatory, permissible or legal), direct dealings with
employees, surface bargaining, unilateral changes and imposing conditions. See
general discussion at Hardin, Patrick (ed.), The Developing Labor Law 5 Ed.,
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Chapter 13, (BNA 2009) and Cox, The Duty To Bargain In Good Faith 71 Harvard
Law Review 1401, 1413. (1958).
If the UTA engaged in surface bargaining, precipitously rushed to impasse, and
imposed the terms and conditions of employment, the UTA may have breached its
duty to collective bargain for new terms and conditions of employment.
It has been held that an employer that did not bargain to impasse, cannot
implement its last offer because it has not engaged in good faith bargaining as
required by the NLRA. Accurate Die Casting Co., 292 NLRB 982 (1989). Other
precedent holds that unilateral implementation, in itself, is a strong indication that the
employer has not engaged in good faith bargaining. NLRB v. Parents & Friends of
the Specialized Living Center, 879 F. 2d 1442 (CA7, 1979).
Indeed, a refusal to bargain, by implementing new terms and conditions of
employment, is considered &per se refusal to bargain and breach of the bargaining
duty, without even evaluating the subjective good faith of the employer. Justice
Brennan of the United States Supreme Court wrote in the seminal case of the National
Labor Relations Board v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962), as follows:
The duty to 'bargain collectively' enjoined by §
8(a)(5) [of the N.L.R.A.] is defined by §8(d) as the
duty to 'meet***and confer in good faith with
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment.' Clearly, the duty thus
defined may be violated without a general failure
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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of subjective good faith; for there is no occasion to
consider the issue of good faith if a party has
refused even to negotiate in fact - Ho meet***and
confer' -about any of the mandatory subjects. A
refusal to negotiate in fact as to any subject which
is within § 8(d), and about which the union seeks
to negotiate, violates §8(a)(5) though the employer
has every desire to reach agreement with the union
upon an over-all collective agreement and
earnestly and in all good faith bargains to that end.
We hold that an employer's unilateral change in
conditions of employment under negotiation is
similarly a violation of § 8(a)(5), for it is a
circumvention of the duty to negotiate which
frustrates the objectives of § 8(a)(5) much as does
a flat refusal.
[Emphasis by italics in original, by underlining
added, footnotes omitted.]
369 U.S. 736, 742-743.
Thus, impasse is but a part of the issue of whether legitimate collective
bargaining has taken place. In Labors Health and Welfare Trust Fund vs. Advanced
Lightweight Concrete, 484 U.S. 539 (1988), at footnote 5, the Supreme Court
observed:
As the Court of Appeals correctly stated:
"'Impasse' is an imprecise term of art:
"The definition of an 'impasse' is understandable
enough- that point at which the parties have
exhausted the prospects of concluding an
agreement and further discussions would be
fruitless- but its application can be difficult. Given
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the many factors commonly itemized by the Board
and courts in impasse cases, perhaps all that be
said with confidence is that an impasse is a 'state
of facts in which the parties, despite the best of
faith, are simply deadlocked.' The Board and
courts look to such matters as the number of
meetings between the company and the union, the
length of those meetings and the period of time
that has transpired between the start of
negotiations and their breaking off. There is no
magic number of meetings, hours or weeks which
will reliably determine when an impasse has
occurred.
"R. Gorman, Basic Text on Labor Law:
Unionization and Collective Bargaining 448
(1976) (citation omitted)." 779 F. 2d 497, 600, n. 3
(CA9 1985).
In footnote 6, the Supreme Court goes on to say:
Freezing the status quo ante after a collective
bargaining agreement has expired promotes
industrial peace by fostering a non-coercive
atmosphere that is conducive to serious
negotiations on a new contract.
Thus, an
employer's failure to honor the terms and
conditions of an expired collective bargaining
agreement pending negotiations on a new
agreement constitutes bad faith bargaining in
breach of sections 8(a)(1), 8(a)(5) and 8(d) of the
National Labor Relations Act.
484 U.S. 539, 543-544.
Reaching a legitimate impasse has been held under the NLRA to entitle an
employer to unilaterally implement its last and best offer and end the status quo ante
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of continuing the terms and conditions of the expired agreement. See American Ship
Building Co. v. NLRB, 380 US 300 (1965).
However, in the case at hand, an impasse does not allow the UTA, as it had
asserted, to change employment terms and conditions, even if it were a legitimate
impasse under federal labor laws. This is because the Fact-Finding Provisions of the
Arrangement at Section 9(g) preserve the terms and conditions of the expired C.B.A.
until the conclusion of fact-finding . UTA incorrectly alleged and argued in effect
that only "if fact finding is invoked, the terms of the expired collective bargaining
agreement remain in effect until fact finding is completed. However,...neither the
UTA nor the Union has invoked fact-finding." (R. 4).
The Union disputed that fact-finding had to be invoked to preserve the status
quo. Prior to the Complaint being filed, the Union had sought to arbitrate this labor
dispute under Section 8 of the Arrangement. The UTA acknowledge it had a duty to
arbitrate this dispute and agreed to do so "however specious it may be ..." (R. 76).
The Union's contention turned out not to be specious at all, and it prevailed on
its position. Arbitrator Axon, in a decision issued subsequent to the Amended Ruling
of the District Court, held that fact-finding did not have to be invoked by either party
2

As Utah transit employees have no right to strike under U.C.A. § 17B-2a-813(b), or no
right to interest arbitration, fact finding was determined to be the way to settle the inability
of the parties to negotiate a successor agreement. In effect, it is part of the collective
bargaining process.
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for the provisions of the expired contract to remain in force. He ordered they be
restored retroactive to December 21, 2009 and effective until fact-finding is concluded
or March 4, 2011.
In hindsight, it is clear that the actions of the UTA in unilaterally implementing
new terms and conditions of employment were wrong. It is argued that this unilateral
action tainted the whole collective bargaining process. The Union contends the UTA
engaged in surface bargaining and wrongfully

declared impasse to justify

implementation. These are bad faith collective bargaining tactics.
The above discussion is meant to inform this Court as to the nature of the labor
disputes for which the Union is seeking an arbitration in resolution on the merits.
Because Utah courts so rarely deal with labor disputes, the discussion is felt necessary
to demonstrate that the dispute over impasse which UTA brought before the district
court, is actually part of the ongoing dispute alleging a breach by the UTA of its
collective bargaining duties protected by the Arrangement. These labor disputes are
clearly subject to arbitration under the Arrangement.
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POINT III: ALLEGATIONS OF UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
INVOLVING COLLECTIVE BARGAINING MUST
BE RESOLVED BY AN ARBITRATOR PURSUANT
TO THE 13 (C) ARRANGEMENT.
i

Pursuant to Section 107 the Utah Uniform Arbitration Act, the district court
must determine if there is an arbitration agreement covering the disputes before the
i

court. If so, the court should compel the parties before the court to arbitrate the
matters in dispute and stay the judicial proceedings. U.C.A. § 78B-11-108 and ATU
Local 382 v. UTA, 99 P 3d 379 (Ut. Crt. App. 2004).
There is clearly an agreement to arbitrate labor disputes and controversies
regarding the terms of the Arrangement at Section 8(a) of the Protective Arrangement.
Again this provision states:
Any labor dispute or controversy between the
[UTA] and any employee represented by the
Union or between the [UTA] and the Union,
regarding the application, interpretation, or
enforcement of this Arrangement, which cannot be
settled by the parties within thirty (30) days after
the dispute or controversy first arises, may be
submitted at the written request of either the
[UTA] or the Union to a board of arbitration to be
settled as hereinafter provided.
The Arrangement protects, preserves, and continues collective bargaining rights
of employees established under state law, pursuant to Section 3 of the Arrangement
which states:
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The collective bargaining rights of employees
represented by the Union including the right to
arbitrate or otherwise resolve labor disputes and to
maintain check-off arrangements, as provided by
applicable
laws, policies and/or existing
agreements
shall
be
preserved
and
continued;
The Public body [UTA] agrees that
it will bargain collectively with the Union or
otherwise arrange for the continuation of collective
bargaining, and that it will enter into agreement
with the Union or arrange for such agreements to
be entered into, relative to all subjects which are or
may be proper for subjects of collective
bargaining. [Emphasis added].
This is a clear statement of collective bargaining rights and duties protected by
and subject to the Arrangement. By virtue of the Arrangement and acceptance of
federal funds, the UTA has agreed that it is the province of a labor arbitrator, not the
state court, to see whether the rights under the Arrangement, protecting the state law
of collective bargaining, have been violated.
While the district court concluded the disputes at issue were not subject to
arbitration, its basis for doing so is a mystery. The court's decision lacks any
discussion or explanation as to why the Arrangement's arbitration provisions should
not be given effect in this instance.
Nor did the district court explain why Utah's policy favoring arbitration should
not be determinative of finding the issues are not arbitrable. The Utah Supreme Court
has directed the district court "to interpret arbitration clauses in a manner that favors
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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arbitration". Docutel Olivetti v. Dick Brady Systems, 731 P 2d 475 at 479, (Utah
1986), citing Lindon City v. Engineers Construction Co. 636 P 2d 1070 at 1073 (Utah
1981), quoting King County v. Boeing Co., 18 Wash App 595, 602-03; 570 P 2d 713,
717(1977):
[Arbitration is a remedy freely bargained for by
the parties, and 'provides a means of giving effect
to the intention of the parried, easing court
congestion, and providing a method more
expeditious and less expensive for the resolution of
disputes

Arbitration clauses should be liberally interpreted
when the issue contested is (sic) the scope of the
clause. If the scope of the clause is debatable or
reasonably in doubt, the clause should be
construed in favor of arbitration.

In Docutel, the Utah Supreme Court found that the contract was not a model of
clarity, having provisions for separate remedies in arbitration at law. Nonetheless, it
reversed the District Court and ordered arbitration in keeping with state policy
favoring arbitration.
Moreover, arbitration of labor disputes has long been favored under federal law
as sound public policy. The U.S. Supreme Court's seminal labor law cases under the
Labor Management Relations Act, known as the Steelworkers Trilogy, have long been
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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precedent for establishing the place of arbitration as the favored national policy as the
means for settling labor disputes. The court stated:
...[that courts] have no business weighing
the merits of the grievance, considering whether
there is equity in a particular claim, or determining
whether there is particular language in the written
instrument which will support the claim. The
agreement is to submit all grievances to arbitration,
not merely those the court will deem meritorious.
The processing of even frivolous claims may have
therapeutic values which those who are not a part
of the plant environment may be quite unaware.
United Steelworkers of America v. American Manufacturing Co., 363 US 564, 568,
46 LRRM 2414, at 2415-6 (1960).
In the companion case, the court held that labor agreements create a
presumption that disputes are arbitrable, stating "an order to arbitrate the particular
grievance should not be denied unless it can be said with positive assurance that the
arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted
dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage" United Steelworkers v.
Warrior and Gulf, 363 U.S. 574, at 582-583 (1960). See also AT&T Technologies,
Inc. v. Communication Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 650 (1986), and Oil Chemical and
Atomic Workers International Union Local 5-391 et. al. v. Conoco, Inc., 241 F3d
1299 (CA10, 2001).

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

27

f

The U.S. Department of Labor's policy is also to defer resolving this dispute to
arbitration. It is noteworthy that the Arrangement, which was drafted by the
Department of Labor, does not require joint submission on the issues to the arbitrator.

{

Either party may refer disputes to arbitration under Section 8(a) of the Arrangement.
The Union is not relegated to arbitrating only the UTA's limited definition of the
dispute, such as whether or not there was an impasse.
In view of the presumptions of arbitrability, the district court would have to
make a very clear finding as to why the Arrangement's arbitration provisions do not
apply. It did not do so, nor could it because the labor disputes at issue are plainly
within the scope of the arbitration clause.
The UTA's contentions before the district court for finding the disputes are not
subject to arbitration are not persuasive. In its Complaint, UTA contended that the
issue of impasse in collective bargaining is not subject to arbitration "because it does
not require the 'application, interpretation, or enforcement' of the 13(c)
Arrangement..." (R. 4-5). This artful pleading and posturing, takes the word
"impasse" completely out its collective bargaining context and wrongfully claims it as
an issue having nothing to with the Arrangement. Good faith collective bargaining
must take place for there to be a legitimate impasse.
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UTA's pleading also presumes too much. It declares (without asking the court
to do so) that z/there was an impasse in bargaining, the UTA could unilaterally change
conditions of employment. (R. 3). The UTA claims this right notwithstanding the
Fact-Finding Provision in the Arrangement which was in dispute! The Arrangement
does not use the terms "if fact-finding is invoked" at paragraph 9(g). (R. 4). To the
contrary, by virtue of paragraphs 9(a) and (g) of the Arrangement, Arbitrator Axon
held that the UTA violated the Arrangement when it "imposed the terms and
conditions for a successor Agreement prior to the invocation of the mandatory fact
finding process." (See Arbitration Board's Award, page 35 of Exhibit "A" of
Affidavit of Rodney Dunn).
For that matter, the word "require" as alleged by the UTA at paragraph 21 of
the Complaint, is not in the Arrangement. (R.5-6). The Arrangement actually states
at Section 8(a) that "Any labor disputes .. ..between the Public Body and the Union
regarding the application, interpretation, or enforcement of the Arrangement..." may
be arbitrated. (Italics added).
The alleged unfair labor practices of UTA (including the impasse issue) do in
fact regard and require application, interpretation and enforcement of the collective
bargaining rights protected by the Arrangement under paragraph 3, against the
wrongful declaration of impasse and unilateral implementation of new terms and
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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conditions by the UTA. The district court should have granted the Union's motion to
compel arbitration of its allegations of bad faith bargaining, including the issue of
impasse, without hesitation. Instead it denied it for no reason.
Nor do the Union's bargaining rights have its source only in Utah law, as
contended by the UTA. As argued above, under Donovan, the Arrangement protects
federal policies of collective bargaining which give meaning and depth to the state's
bare bones collective bargaining statute.
The Arrangement plainly contemplates that disputes over violations of state law
protecting collective bargaining rights are subject to arbitration. This intention is
clearly within the four comers of the Arrangement at paragraph 3, and as such is the
type of labor dispute that is subject to arbitration under paragraph 8(a). The
arbitration language is unambiguous and as such should be enforced as a matter of
law. See Dixon v. Pro Image Inc., 87 P.2d 48 (Utah 1999), citing Willard Pease Oil &
Gas Co. v. Pioneer Oil & Gas Co., 899 P.2d 766, 770 (Utah 1995).
Utah law explicitly delegates to the Secretary of Labor the determination of the
''employee protective conditions and remedies of Section 13(c) of the Urban Mass
Transportation Act of 1964, 49 U.S.C. Sec. 5333(b), as determined by the Secretary of
Labor". U. C. A. § 17B-2a-813(l). (Italics added). It is entirely appropriate that the
Department of Labor provides for a labor law arbitrator to resolve unfair labor
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practice disputes under the Arrangement. The arbitrator has the expertise and time
that the state courts lack to hear these disputes. The UTA, by accepting federal funds,
in effect waived its right to resort to the state courts to determine the scope of its
collective bargaining obligation under the Arrangement.
The United States Supreme Court recently held in 14 Perm Plaza LLC v. Pyett,
556 U.S. 1456, 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009) holding that a union waived a bargaining unit
member's right to file an age discrimination claim in a judicial forum when the
collective bargaining agreement requires mandatory arbitration of claims under the
Age Discrimination In Employment Act. Thus, under federal arbitration law, it is
permissible, for the parties to labor agreements, to stipulate that statutory rights must
be enforced by arbitration rather than agency or court action.

Under the clear

language of the Arrangement and requirements of Utah arbitration law, the Union's
allegations of unfair labor practices involving collective bargaining rights must be
arbitrated rather than litigated before the district court.

CONCLUSION
The Court should reverse the decision of the Utah district court, remand and direct it
to grant the Union's Motion To Compel Arbitration and dismiss the UTA's action.
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FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
UTAH TRANSIT AUTHORITY, a Utah
public transit district,
Plaintiff,
vs.
'

LOCAL 382 OF THE AMALGAMATED
TRANSIT UNION

j

!

RULING ON DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO COMPEL
ARBITRATION
AND
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
Case No. 100 907 409

Defendant.
Judge: L.A. DEVER

This matter came on for hearing on cross motions. The plaintiff was represented
by Scott A. Hagen, D. Zachary Wiseman and Liesel B. Stevens. The defendant was
represented by Joseph E. Hatch and Arthur F. Sandack. After considering the
memoranda of the parties and the arguments presented the Court rules as follows, after
noting that the following facts are not in dispute and are contained in the memoranda of
both parties:
1. Plaintiff Utah Transit Authority (UTA) is a Utah Public Transit District
with operations in several Utah counties along the Wasatch Front with its headquarters
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in Salt Lake County
2. Defendant Local 382 of the Amalgamated Transit Union (Union) is an
unincorporated association with its principal office in Salt Lake County.
3. The Union is the recognized exclusive representative for purposes of
collective bargaining of certain UTA employees that are described in a series of
collective bargaining agreements (CBA) between UTA and the Union.
4. The most recent CBA expired on December 10, 2009, but was.
extended by agreement of the parties to December 21, 2009.
5. The parties began negotiations for a successor agreement in August of
200'9. The parties met approximately fourteen times during this period.
6. After December 21,1009, UTA declared that an impasse had occurred
and discontinued negotiations.
7. Based on the declaration of impasse, UTA implemented changes to the
employees' terms and conditions of employment and informed the Union of these
I— *%4-] .—.ft t^

CTwiivJliO.

8. In addition to a CBA, the Union and UTA were and are subject to an
arrangement pursuant to Section 13(c) of the Urban IVlass Transit Act of 1964 (Section
13(c) Arrangement), which requires, in general, that public transit agencies that receive

2
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federal funds make "protective arrangements" for the benefit of employees.
9. The 13(c) Arrangement governing UTA and its employees is
enforceable in State Court and is governed by state law.
10. Pursuant to the Section 13(c) Arrangement, if "fact finding" is invoked
by either party the terms of the expired CBA remain in effect until fact-finding is
completed.
11. Neither side has invoked fact finding.
12. The parties do not agree on the application of Section 13(c). The
Union contends that Paragraph 8 of the Arrangement is a general arbitration obligation.
UTA claims that it is limited to "application, interpretation, or enforcement of the Section
13 (c) Arrangement.
13. The parties have agreed to arbitrate the issue of the application of
whether Section 13(c) Arrangement, specifically fl (9)(g) of the Arrangement prohibited
UTA from modifying the terms and conditions of employment on December 21, 2009.

ISSUES
Is Arbitration mandated by either the CBA or the Section 13(c) Arrangement?
1. The CBA between the parties provides for arbitration of disputes under

3
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the agreement. Upon the expiration of the CBA the arbitration provision ceased to have
effect. There existed an opportunity for either side to invoke the fact finding process. If
such invocation occurred the expired CBA would remain in effect. Neither side invoked
fact finding. No evidence has been presented on the question of the expiration of the
time to request fact finding. For the purposes of these motions, an arbitration obligation
has not been shown to exist.
2. The Section 13(c) Arrangement does require arbitration. However, the
arbitration requirement only applies to the application, interpretation, or enforcement of
the Section 13(c) Arrangement. The position of the Union to broaden the scope of the
application of the arbitration requirement to the underlying CBA is not well taken.
The Union cites to the recent case of Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 192, AFL-CiO
vs Alameda-Contra Costa Transit District, Case No. RG10522627, of the Superior Court
for the County of Alameda, for the proposition that a Section 13(c) Arrangement
requires arbitration. Although that case has substantial similarity in facts to the instant
case, the Superior Court was asked to issue a Preliminary Injunction to maintain the
status quo pending arbitration. That arbitration had previously been ordered by the
Court. Those are not the facts of this case.

4
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Does this Court have Jurisdiction to Address the Actions of UTA?
Utah Code 17B-2a-813 provides that the District Court is empowered to decide
whether or not UTA violated Utah labor laws, failed to bargain in good faith or is subject
to an arbitration obligation under a CBA. The Federal provisions contained in the
Section 13(c) Arrangement have been clearly determined not to supersede state law but
are tools to protect the collective bargaining rights of the workers. See Jackson Transit
Auth. V. Local Division 1285, Amalgamated Transit Union, 457 U.S. 15 (1982).

CONCLUSION
The Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration pursuant to Section 13(c)
Arrangement of the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964 is denied. • The Motion to
Stay Judicial Proceeding being tied to the granting of the Motion to Compel Arbitration
is therefore also denied.
The Plaintiff in its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is not asking whether
UTA violated Utah law in implementing changed terms and conditions. The answer to
this requires deciding factual issues: whether there was bargaining in good faith,
whether the impasse concept was properly invoked and whether the invoking of factfinding is still viable.

5
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Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is on the issue of who has
jurisdiction to determine if UTA violated Utah Law. This Court concludes that it is the
Judicial System that has that authority, not a third party arbitrator.
This stands as the Final Order of the Court.
DATED AND SIGNED this ^

day of September, 2010.

6
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling was mailed
the 8th day of September, 2010, to the following:

Joseph E. Hatch
5295 South Commerce Drive, Ste 200
Murray, UT 84107
Arthur F. Sandack
8 East Broadway, Ste 411
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Scott A. Hagen
D. Zachary Wiseman
Liesel B. Stevens
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER, P.C.
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0385
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Deputy Court Cle<k)
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SCOTT A. HAGEN (4840)
D. ZACHARY WISEMAN (8316)
DAVID B. DIBBLE (10222)
RAY QUTNNEY & NEBEKER P.C.
36 South State Street, Suite 1400
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385
Telephone: (801)532-1500
Facsimile: (801)532-7543
shagen@.rqn.com
zwiseman@rqn. com
Attorneys for Defendant Utah Transit Authority
m THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
UTAH TRANSIT AUTHORITY, a Utah
public transit district,
Plaintiff,

!

AMENDED RULING ON
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO COMPEL
ARBITRATION AND PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

v.
LOCAL 382 OF THE AMALGAMATED
TRANSIT UNION,
Defendant.

Civil No. 100907409
i

Judge L. A. Dever

This matter came on for hearing on cross motions. The plaintiff was represented by Scott
A. Hagen, D. Zachary Wiseman and Liesel B. Stevens. The defendant was represented by
Joseph E. Hatch and Arthur F. Sandack. After considering the memoranda of the parties and the
ai'guments presented, the Court rules as follows, after noting that the following facts are not in
dispute and are contained in the memoranda of both parties:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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1.

Plaintiff Utah Transit Authority ("UTA53) is a Utah Public Transit District with

operations in several Utah counties along the Wasatch Front with its headquarters in Salt Lake
County.
2.

• Defendant Local 382 of the Amalgamated Transit Union ("Union") is an

unincorporated association with its principal office in Salt Lake County.
3.

The Union is the recognized exclusive representative for purposes of collective

bargaining of certain UTA employees that are described in a series of collective bargaining
agreements ("CB A") between UTA and the Union.
4.

The most recent CBA expired on December 10, 2009, but was extended by

agreement of the parties to December 21, 2009.
5.

The parties began negotiations for a successor agreement in August of 2009. The

parties met approximately fourteen times during this period.
6.

After December 21, 2009, UTA declared that an impasse had occurred and

discontinued negotiations.
7.

Based on the declaration of impasse, UTA implemented changes to the

employees' terms and conditions of employment and informed the Union of these actions.
8.

In addition to a CBA, the Union and UTA were and are subject to an arrangement

pursuant to Section 13(c) of the Urban Mass Transit Act of 1964 (Section 13(c) Arrangement),
which requires, in general, that public transit agencies that receive federal funds make
"protective arrangements" for the benefit of employees.
9.

The 13(c) Arrangement governing UTA and its employees is enforceable in State

Court and is governed by state law.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR,
n may contain errors.

10.

Pursuant to the Section 13(c) Arrangement, if fact-finding is invoked by either

party the terms of the expired CBA remain in effect until fact-finding is completed.
11.

Neither side has invoked fact finding.

12.

The parties do not agree on the application of Section 13(c). The Union contends

that Paragraph 8 of the Arrangement is aldn to a general arbitration obligation. The parties agree
that the arbitration obligation is limited to the "application, interpretation, or enforcement" of the
Section 13(c) Arrangement, but they disagree as to the limitations imposed by that language.
13.

The parties have agreed to arbitrate the issue of the application of whether Section

13(c) Arrangement, specifically f (9)(g) of the Arrangement prohibited UTA from modifying the
terms and conditions of employment on December 21, 2009.
ISSUES
Is Arbitration mandated by the Section 13(c) Arrangement?
The Section 13(c) Arrangement does require arbitration. However, the arbitration
requirement only applies to the application, interpretation, or enforcement of the Section 13(c)
Arrangement. The Union cites to the recent case of Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 192,
AFL-CIO vs. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit District, Case No. RG10522627, of the Superior
Court for the County of Alameda, for the proposition that a Section 13(c) Arrangement requires
arbitration. Although that case has substantial similarity in facts to the instant case, the Superior
Court was asked to issue a Preliminary Injunction to maintain the status quo pending arbitration.
That arbitration had previously been ordered by the Court. Those are not the facts of this case.
Does this Court have Jurisdiction to Address the Actions of UTA?
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Utah Code 17B-2a-813 provides that the District Court is empowered to decide whether
or not UTA violated Utah labor laws, failed to bargain in good faith or is subject to an arbitration
obligation under a CBA. The Federal provisions contained in the Section 13(c) Arrangement
have been clearly determined not to supersede state law but are tools to protect the collective
bargaining rights of the workers. See Jackson Transit Auth. v. Local Division 1285,
Amalgamated Transit Union, 457 U.S. 15 (1982).
CONCLUSION
The Plaintiff in its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is not asking whether UTA
violated Utah law in implementing changed terms and conditions. The answer to this requires
deciding factual issues: whether there was bargaining in good faith, whether the impasse concept
was properly invoked and whether the invoicing of fact-finding is still viable.
Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is on the issue of who has jurisdiction
to determine if UTA violated Utah Law. This Court concludes that it is Judicial System that has
that authority, not a third party arbitrator.
This stands as the Final Order of the Court.
DATED this ^T

day of November, 2010.
BY THE COURT:

\y

\

L. X! Devel:
District Judge
Approved as to form:

,yWs
Joseph E. Hatch, Esq.
Attorney for the Union
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing AMENDED RULING ON
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION AND PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT was mailed the

day of November, 2010, to the

following:
Joseph E. Hatch, Esq.
5295 South Commerce Drive, Suite 200
Murray, Utah 84107
Arthur F. Sandack
8 East Broadway, Suite 411
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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ADDENDUM C
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Saptembar 23, 1953
A??22DII "a"
Protective Arangement Pursuant to Section 13(c)
of the Federal Transit Act.
(a) The Project shall be carried out in full
compliance with the protective conditions
described herein and in such a manner and upon
such terms and conditions as will not adversely
affect employees represented by Local 382,
Amalgamated Transit Union, AFL-CIO ("Union") .
(b) Subparagraph (a) is intended to express the
general requirement that the rights and
interests of employees represented by the Union
be protected from the effects of the Project.
Initially, this means that the Utah Transit
Authority ("Public Body") in designing and
implementing the Project must consider /the
effects the Project may have on employees
represented by the Union and attempt to
minimize any adverse effects as a result of the
Project. If objectives can be met without
adversely effecting such employees as a result
of the project, it is expected that adverse
effects as a result of the project will be
avoided. The duty to minimize adverse effects
as a result of the project is not intended to
preclude all actions which would adversely
affect employees, but to balance such actions
in favor of the interests of employees. In the
context of particular Project events, this
paragraph is to be read in conjunction with
other provisions of this Arrangement. It
thereby is intended to emphasize the specific
statutory requirements that the employees be
protected against a worsening of their
employment conditions as a result of the
Project and receive offsetting benefits to make
them "whole" when unavoidable adverse effects
occur as a result of the project.
All rights, privileges, and benefits (including
pension rights and benefits) of employees
represented by'the Union (including employees
having already retired) under existing
collective bargaining agreements or otherwise,
or under any revision or renewal thereof, shall
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be preserved and continued provided, however,
that such rights, privileges and benefits not
previously vestad may be modified by collective
bargaining and agreement of the Pyblic Body or
'other operator of the transit'system and the
Union to substitute other rights, privileges
and benefits.
The collective bargaining rights of employees
represented by the Union including the right to
arbitrate or otherwise resolve labor disputes
and to maintain checkoff arrangements, as
"provided by applicable laws, policies and/or
existing collective bargaining agreements shall
be preserved and continued; provided, however,
that this provision shall not be interpreted so
as to require the Public Body to retain any
such rights which exist by virtue of a
collective bargaining agreement after-such
agreement is no longer in effect, except (a) as
may otherwise by required under Federal labor
policy with respect to the arbitration of
grievances arising under such agreement, or (b)
as may be required under applicable law,
including Section 13(c) of the Act, or (c) as
may be required under paragraph (9) of this
Arrangement. . The Public body agrees that it
will bargain collectively with the Union or
otherwise arrange for the continuation of
collective bargaining, and that it will enter
into agreements with the Union or arrange for
such agreements to be entered into,' relative to
all subjects which are or. may be proper
subjects- of collective bargaining.
Any employee represented by the Union who is
laid off or otherwise deprived of employment or
placed in a worse position with respect to
compensation at any time during his or her
employment as a result of the Project,
including any program of efficiencies or
economies directly or indirectly related
thereto, shall be entitled to receive any
applicable rights, privileges and benefits as
specified in the employee protective
arrangements attached hereto and made a part
hereof as Exhibit "A"; provided, however, that
nothing in Exhibit "A" shall be deemed to
supersede or displace any other provisions of
this arrangement, and in the event of any
conflict or inconsistency between them, the
other provisions of this Arrangement shall
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-3control. Any employee represented by the Union
who is placed in a worse position with respect
to hours, working conditions, fringe benefits,
or rights and privileges pertaining thereto at
any time during his or her employment as a
result of the project shall be made whole.
Arbitrators' awards must wholly compensate
employees for the harm they suffer, but this
does not necessarily or strictly require in all
circumstances the restitution of the precise
benefit, right or privilege lost or adversely
affected as a result of the Project,
Reasonable efforts shall first be made to provide
restitution of the precise benefit, right or
privilege lost or adversely affected as a
result of the project. If such efforts are
unseuccessful or would be unsuitable, an
alternative remedy, awarding-either 1)
offsetting benefits where such an award would
result in a fair and equitable substitute or 2)
compensatory damages where the harm has a
readily ascertainable economic value and such
an alternative remedy is fair and equitable,
may be acceptable.
(5) (a) The Public Body shall be financially
responsible for the application of these
conditions and will make the necessary
arrangements so that any employee who is
affected as a result of the Project may file a
claim with the Public Body within sixty (60)
days of the date the employee is terminated or
laid off as a result of the Project, or within
eighteen (18) months of the date the employee's
position with respect to the employee's
employment is otherwise worsened as a result of
the Project; provided, in the latter case, if
the events giving rise to the claim have
occurred over an extended period, the 13-month
limitation shall be measured from the last such
event; provided, further, that no benefits
shall be payable for any period prior to six
(6) months from the date of the filing of the
claim. Unless such a claim is filed with the
Public Body within such time limitations, the
Public Body shall thereafter be relieved of all
liabilities and obligations related to such
claim.
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•4(b) In the case of a claim filed under this
paragraph, the Public Body will either fully
honor the claim, making appropriate payments,
or will give notice to the claimant and the
Union of the basis for denying or modifying
such claiin, giving reasons therefor. In the
event the Public Body fails to honor such
claim,' the Union may invoke the following
procedures for further joint investigation of
the claim by giving notice of its desire to
pursue such procedures. Within ten (.10) days
from the receipt by the Public Body of such
notice, the parties shall exchange such factual
information as may be available to them
relevant to the disposition of the claim and
shall jointly take such steps as may be
necessary or desirable to obtain from any third
parties such additional factual material as may
be relevant. As soon as practicable
thereafter, the parties shall meet and attempt
to agree upon the proper disposition of the
claim. If no such agreement is reached, and
the Public Body decides to reject the claim, it
shall give written notice of its final
rejection of the claim, detailing- its reasons
therefor. In the event the claim is so
rejected by the Public Body, the claim may be
processed to arbitration as provided by
paragraph (3) of this Arrangement. Prior to
the arbitration hearing the parties shall
exchange a list of intended witnesses. In
conjunction with such proceedings, the board of
arbitration shall have the power to subpoena
witnesses upon the request of any party and to
compel the production of documents and other
information denied in the pre-arbitration
period which is relevant to the disposition of
the claim.
(a) During the employee's protective period, as
defined in Exhibit "A", any employee who has
been laid off or otherwise deprived of
employment as a result of the Project shall be
granted, if such employee requests in writing,
priority of employment or remployment to fill
any vacant position on the transit system
reasonably comparable to that which the
employee held when dismissed for which the
employee is, or by training or re-training for
a reasonable period can become, qualified; not,
however, in contravention o.f collective
bargaining agreements related thereto. In the
v^
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event training or ra-training is required by
such employment"or reemployment, the Public
Body or other operator of the transit system
shall provide or provide for such training or
re-training at no cost to the employee, and
such employee shall be paid, while training or
re-training, the salary or hourly rate provided
for in the applicable collective bargaining
agreement for such position, plus any
displacement allowance to which the employee
may be otherwise entitled. If a dismissed
employee who has made such request fails,
without good cause, within ten (10) days to
accept an offer of a position comparable to
that held when dismissed, for which the
employee is qualified or for which the employee
has satisfactorily completed such training, the
employee shall, effective at the expiration of
such 10-day period, forfeit all rights and .
benefits under this Arrangement.
(b) As between employees who request employment
pursuant to this paragraph, the following order
where applicable shall prevail in hiring such
employees:
(i) . Employees in the craft or class of the
vacancy shall be given priority over
employees without seniority in such craft
or class;
(ii)

As between employees having seniority in
the craft or class of the vacancy, the
senior employees, based upon their service
in that craft or class, as shown on the
appropriate seniority roster, shall
prevail over junior employees;

(iii) As between employees not having seniority
in the craft cr class of the vacancy, the
senior employees, based upon their service
• in the crafts or classes in which they do
have seniority, as shown on the
appropriate seniority rosters, shall
prevail over junior employees.
(a) In the event the Public Body contemplates any
change in the organization or operation of its
system which may result in the dismissal or
displacement of employees,.or rearrangement of
the working forces represented by the union, as
a result of the Project, the Public Body shall
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-6do so only in accordance with the provisions of
subparagraph (b) hereof. Provided, however,
that changes which are not a result of.ttje
project, but which grow out of the normal
exercise of seniority rights occasioned by
seasonal or other normal schedule changes and
regular picking procedures under the applicable
collective bargaining agreement, shall not be
considered within the purview of this
paragraph.
(b) The Public 3cdy shall give the Union at least
sixty (50) days written.notice of each proposed
change which may result in the dismissal or
displacement of such employees or rearrangement
of the working forces as a result of the
Project, by sending certified mail notice to
the Union. Such notice shall contain a full and
adequate statement- of the proposed changes,
including an estimate of the number of
employees of each classification affected by
intended changes and the number and
classifications of any jobs in the Public
Body's £mployment available to be filled by
such affected employees. At the request of
either the Public Body or the Union,
negotiations for the purpose of reaching an
agreement with respect to the application of
the terms and conditions of this Arrangement
shall commence immediately. These negotiations
shall include determining the selection of
forces from among the urban mass transportation
employees who may be affected as a result of
the Project, to establish which such employees
shall be offered employment with the Public
Body for which they*are qualified or .can be
trained; not, however, in contravention of
collective bargaining agreements relating
thereto, and any assignment of employees
represented by the Union made necessary by the
intended changes shall be made on the basis of
an agreement between the Public body and the
Union. If no agreement is reached within
twenty (20) days from the commencement of
negotiations, either party may submit it to
arbitration in accordance with procedures
contained in paragraph (8) hereof. The
Authority of the arbitrator shall be limited to
the determination of the dispute regarding the
application of the terms and conditions of this
Arrangement to the intended change. In any
such arbitration, the terms of this Arrangement

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

are to be interpreted and applied in favor of
providing employee protections and benefits no
less than those established pursuant to Section
5(2) (f) of the Interstate Commerce Act,
currently codified at 49 U.S.C. 11347.
(a) Any labor dispute or controversy between the
Public Body and any employee represented by the
Union or between the Public Body and the tlnion,
regarding the application,.interpretation, or
enforcement of this Arrangement, which cannot
be settled by the parties within thirty (30)
days after the dispute or controversy first
arises, may be submitted at the written request
of either the Public Body or the Union to a
beard of arbitration to be selected as
hereinafter provided.
(b) The Public Body and the Union shall each,
within five (5) days after a request under
subparagraph (a), select one member of the
arbitration board and the two members thus
chosen shall select a third member who shall
serve as chairman. If either party fails to
select its member within the prescribed time
limit, the highest officer of the Union, on the
one hand, or of the Public Body on the other,
or their nominees, as case may be, shall be
deemed to be the selected member, and the board
of arbitration shall then function and its
decision shall have the same force and effect
as though the parties had selected 'their
members. Should the two members be unable to
agree upon the appointment of the neutral
member within ten (10) days, either may request
the American Arbitration Association to furnish
a list of (5) persons from which the neutral
member shall be selected. The two members
selected by the parties shall, within seven (7)
• . days after the receipt of such list, determine
by lot the order of elimination, and thereafter
each shall, in that order, alternately
eliminate one name until only one name remains.
The remaining person on the list shall be the
neutral member.
(c) The board-of arbitration shall render its
decision within forty-five (45) days after the
date of the close of the hearing. The decision
shall be by majority vote of the arbitration
board and shall be final, binding and
conclusive.
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-8(d) The board of arbitration shall have no
authority to £dd to, delete from, or change the
terms of this Arrangement. The fees and
expenses^of the neutral member, as well as any
other joint expenses incidental to the
arbitration, shall be borne equally by the
parties, and all other expenses shall be paid
by the party incurring them.
(e) In the event of any disputa as to whether or
not a particular employee was affected by the
Project, it shall be the employee's obligation
to identify the Project and specify the
pertinent facts relied upon.. It shall then be
the burden of the Public Body to prove that
factors other than the Project affected the
employee. The claiming employee shall prevail
if it is established that the Project had an
effect upon the employee even if other factors
may also have affected the employee.
(9) (a) Any labor dispute between the Public Body and
the Union regarding the making or maintaining
of a collective bargaining agreement, or the
wages, hours, working conditions, or other
terms to be included in such an agreement,
which cannot be settled by the parties within
sixty (50) days after the dispute first arises
may be submitted at the written request of
either such party to fact finding in accordance
with this paragraph.
(b) Upon a written request for fact finding, the
Public Body and the Union shall meet and
attempt to agree on an acceptable neutral fact
finder. If the parties are unable to agree on
a neutral fact finder within ten (10) days
after the request for fact finding, either
•party may request the Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service to furnish a list of five
(5) persons from which the neutral fact finder
shall be selected. The request shall specify a
preference for neutral fact finders experienced
in matters of transportation and public sector
interest disputes, and having a place of
business in one of the following States:
Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Utah or Wyoming. The
parties shall, within seven (7) days after
receipt of such list, determine by lot the
order of elimination, and thereafter each
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shall, in that order, alternatively eliminate
one name until only one name remains. The
remaining person on the list shall be the
neutral fact finder.
In connection with a factfinding proceeding
under this paragraph; the Public Body and the
Union shall exchange such factual information
as may be available to them, reasonable in
nature and scope, and relevant to the issues
presented. The parties agree that no such
relevant information shall be withheld. In
conjunction with such proceedings, the neutral
factfinder shall have the power to compel the
production of documents and other information
denied in the pre-factfinding period which is
relevant to the disposition of the issues, and
to adjust the time frames for this factfinding
procedure to allow for the receipt and review
of such information.
In making findings of fact and recommendations
for the resolution of the matters in dispute
the neutral fact finder shall take into
consideration the following factors:
(1)

The stipulations of the parties;

(2)

The financial conditions of the transit
system, the ability of the Public Body to
administer and finance the existing
system, and the interest and welfare of
the public;

(3)

A comparison of the wages, hours, and
terms and conditions of employment of the
Public Body's employees with those of
other public and private employees doing
comparable work giving consideration to
factors peculiar to the community or area
and the job classification involved;

(4)

The overall compensation presently
received by the Public Body's employees,
including wages, hours, and terms and
conditions of employment, and all medical,
insurance, pension, and fringe benefits
received;

(5)

Collective bargaining agreements between
the parties; and
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-10(5)

Such other factors not confined to those
noted above which are normally and
traditionally taken into consideration in
determination of issues submitted to
mutually agreed upon dispute settlement
procedures in public service or private
employment.

(e) Each party shall within five (5) days of the
selection of the neutral fact finder submit to
the other party and the neutral fact finder a
listing of unresolved issues and its position
on the identified issues. The neutral fact
finder shall hold hearings and receive oral or
written testimony as appropriate. Except as
provided in subsection (c), the neutral fact
finder shall issue findings of fact ar.d
recommendations for resolution of the issues in
dispute within forty-five (45) days after the
submission of the listing of issues to the
neutral fact finder. Except as provided in
subsection (f), the recommendations of the fact
finder shall be advisory only and shall not be
binding on either party.
(f) Each party shall notify the neutral fact finder
and the other party to the dispute whether it
accepts the recommendations, in whole or in
part, within fifteen (15) days of the issuance
of such recommendations. If neither party
rejects the recommendations for resolution of
the issues in dispute, such recommendations
shall be deemed to be a final resolution'of the
matters in dispute. If a party does reject
such recommendations, it shall include in its
notification its specific reasons for rejection
in writing. Within two (2) days after the
receipt of a rejection by either party, the
neutral fact finder shall release for
publication in the local media his or her
findings of fact, recommendations for
settlement, the positions of the parties, and
the reasons of the parties for rejection of the
fact finder's recommendations.
(g) The terms and conditions of any expiring
collective bargaining agreement between the
parties shall remain in place following
expiration of such agreement, unless otherwise
mutually agreed in writing by the parties,
until the conclusion of the fact finding
proceedings. The time limitations included in
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-11this paragraph may be extended by mutual
written agreement of the parties. The fees and
expenses of the neutral fact finder, as well as
any other joint expenses incidental to the fact
finding, shall be borne equally by the parties,
and all other expenses shall be paid by the
party incurring them.
Nothing in this Arrangement shall be construed
as depriving any employee of any rights or
benefits which such employee may have under any
existing job security or other protective
conditions or arrangements by collective
bargaining agreement or law where applicable';
provided that there shall be no duplication or
pyramiding of benefits to any employees, and,
provided further, trat any benefit under"this
Arrangement, shall be construed toinclude the conditions, responsibilities, and
obligations accompanying such benefit. This
paragraph is intended to be construed
consistent with the Hodgson Affidavit in
Congress of Railway Unions v. Hodason, 32 6
F.Supp. 68 (D.D.C. 1971), and the Federal
court's interpretation of the concept of
"pyramiding" in New York Dock Railway v. U.S.,
609 F..2d 83, 100-101 (2d Cir. 1979).
The term "Project", as used in this Arrangement
shall not be limited to the particular
facility, service, or operation assisted by
Federal funds, but shall include any changes,
whether organizational, operational,
technological, or otherwise, which are a result
of the assistance provided.
The phrase "as a result of the Project", as
used in this Arrangement, shall include events
occuring in anticipation of, during, and
subsequent to the Project and any program of
efficiencies or economies related thereto;
provided, however, that volume rises and falls
of business, or changes in volume and character
of employment brought about by causes other
than the Project (including any economies or
efficiencies unrelated to the Project) are not
within the purview of this Arrangement.
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-12(c) Except as otherwise provided in paragraph
(6)(a) of Exhibit "A", the term "days", as used
•in this Arrangement, shall mean calendar days.
(12) This Arrangement shall be binding upon the
successors and assigns of the parties hereto,
and no provisions, terms or obligations herein
contained shall be affected, modified, altered,
or changed in any respect whatsoever by reason
of the arrangements made by or for the Public
Body to manage or operate the system. Any
person, enterprise, body, or agency, whether
publicly or privately owned, which shall
undertake the management or operation of the
transit system shall agree to be bound by the
terms of this Arrangement and accept the
responsibility for full performance of these
conditions.
(13) Tie employees represented by the. Union shall
continue to receive coverage under Social
Security, Workmen's Compensation, unemployment
compensation, and the like. In no event shall
these benefits be worsened as a result of the
Project.
(14) In the event any provision of this Arrangement
is held to be invalid or otherwise
unenforceable under the Federal, State or local
law, the remaining provisions of this
Arrangement shall not be affected and the
invalid or unenforceable provisions shall be
re-negotiated for purpose of adequate
replacement under Section 13(c) of the Act. If
such negotiation shall be result in mutually
satisfactory agreement, either party may invoke
the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Labor to
determine substitute fair and equitable
employee protective arrangements for
application only to the particular Project,
which shall be incorporated in this Arrangement
only as applied to that Project, and any other
appropriate action, remedy, or relief.
(15) If this Project is approved for assistance
under the Act, the foregoing terms and
conditions shall be made part of the contract
of assistance between the Federal Government
and the applicant for Federal funds, provided,
however, that these arrangements shall not
merge into the contract of assistance, but
shall be independently binding and enforceable

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-13by and upon the parties, in accordance with its
terms; nor shall the collective bargaining
agreement merge into this Arrangement, but each
shall be independently binding and enforceable
by and upon the parties, in accordance with its
terms.
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